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Abstract 
This paper offers a simple dynamic macroeconomic model to provide a new explanation to the 
co-existence of the following macroeconomic phenomena observed during Japan’s stagnation 
since the early 1990s: the drastic rise in Marshall’s k, the drastic fall in household savings, the 
drastic rise in corporate savings (following their drastic fall in 1980s), and the drastic fall in real 
growth rate. Our extension of the standard macroeconomic model is the explicit incorporation of 
the conflict between corporate insiders (corporate managers and/or employees) and outside 
investors (households) in Japanese corporations. Specifically, in the model we assume that 
insiders may appropriate part of capital returns which should intrinsically accrue to outsiders. 
Under this circumstance, we show that outsiders restrain themselves from the investment in 
productive but appropriable capital and promote the holdings of non-productive but non-
appropriable money. Meanwhile, reacting to this portfolio change of outsiders, insiders increase 
the capital investment using the corporate savings since the amount of outsiders’ capital returns 
which they can appropriate decreases. However, the increase in the capital investment of 
insiders is not large enough to compensate the decrease in that of outsiders, so that the economic 
growth rate falls. Our model can hence describe the macroeconomic phenomena observed 
during Japan’s stagnation in a single optimizing framework. 
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1. Introduction 
  This paper offers a simple dynamic macroeconomic model to provide a new explanation to 
the co-existence of the following macroeconomic phenomena observed during Japan’s 
stagnation since the early 1990s named Japan’s lost two decades. The first is the drastic rise in 
Marshall’s k (see Figure 1 for the ratio of M1 to GDP and Figure 2 for the ratio of M2+CD to 
GDP). The Marshall’s k associated with M1 was quite stable in the 1980s, but began to increase 
from 1990 and has shown a sharp increase in the latter half of 1990s and the 2000s. Also, the 
Marshall’s k associated with M2+CD exhibited a steady increase until the former half of the 
1990s but has accelerated its increase from the latter half of the 1990s. The second is the drastic 
fall in the household savings (see Figure 3 for the ratio of household savings to GDP). The rate 
of household savings exhibited a moderate decline around 10% in the 1980s but has accelerated 
its decrease in the 1990s. The third is the drastic fall in the corporate savings in the 1980s and 
their drastic rise in the 1990s (see Figure 4 for the ratio of corporate savings to GDP). The rate 
of corporate savings exhibited a drastic decline from 6% to almost 0% in the 1980s but has 
shown a drastic rise in the1990s and 2000s. The forth is the drastic fall in the real growth rate 
(see Figure 5 for the growth rate of real GDP). The real growth rate fell from around 4 % per 
annum to near-zero at the beginning of the 1990s and has remained almost zero during the 
1990s and 2000s. 
  This paper argues that all these facts can be simultaneously and consistently explained in a 
single optimizing framework. Specifically, we demonstrate this point in an OLG model of 
endogenous growth, which is an extension of the Tirole (1985) economy. The crucial extension 
is the explicit incorporation of the conflict between corporate insiders and outside investors into 
the model. Specifically, in the model we assume that insiders may appropriate part of capital 
returns which should intrinsically accrue to outsiders. Under this circumstance, we show that, 
outsiders restrain themselves from the investment in productive but appropriable capital and 
promote the holdings of non-productive but non-appropriable money. Meanwhile, reacting to 
this portfolio change of outsiders, insiders increase the capital investment using the corporate 
savings since the amount of outsiders’ capital returns which they can appropriate decreases. 
However, the increase in the capital investment of insiders is not large enough to compensate 
the decrease in that of outsiders. Hence, the economic growth rate falls due to the decrease in 
the total amount of capital investment.  
  In this paper, we interpret corporate insiders in the model as corporate managers and/or 
employees under long-term employment systems. Corporate managers may engage in the 
─ 37 ─ 
appropriation activity known as the “free cash flow” problem. Specifically, they may retain 
corporate profits inside corporations as corporate savings and, using the retained profits, can 
pursue their own benefits at the sacrifice of the capital returns accruing to outside investors. 
Also, employees under long-term employment systems are de facto “inside investors” in the 
sense that their compensations are basically managed under the seniority system, i.e., they 
obtain compensations below their contributions to corporations when young and obtain 
compensations above their contributions when old. Hence, as “inside investors” they can 
appropriate the capital returns accruing to outside investors, demanding a high level of 
compensations when old. Meanwhile, we interpret outside investors in the model as general 
households who have no special connection with each corporation. 
  The interpretation reflects the argument that the decline in bank control yet to be replaced 
by stock market control beginning in the 1980s in Japan led to the escalated conflict of interest 
between corporate insiders and households; see, e.g., Ando, 2002; Ando, Christelis, and 
Miyagawa, 2003; Hayashi, 2006; Saito, 2008; and Murase, 2009 who argue that the vacuum of 
corporate governance has escalated the conflict of interest between corporate insiders and 
households in 1990s and 2000s. Of course, it is not easy to obtain an index properly 
representing the level of appropriation activity within Japanese corporations. However, the 
change in the level of appropriation activity might be approximately captured by the movement 
of corporate payouts (measured as the sum of interest payments and dividend payouts) over 
time. In fact, since the early 1990s the amount of payouts of Japanese corporations has been 
declining continuously and remarkably. Specifically, the ratio of the payouts to GDP (see Figure 
6 for the ratio of the sum of interest payments and dividend payouts of non-financial 
corporations to GDP) has steadily declined from 13% to 5%. This fact may be strong supporting 
evidence which indicates that the appropriation problem of Japanese corporations has become 
increasingly sever during the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, if our interpretation can well trace the 
facts of the Japanese corporate governance, our model can capture the macroeconomic 
phenomena observed during Japan’s stagnation. 
  The present paper is related to several stands of previous research. First, our model is a 
version of the neo-classical supply-side theories which argue that Japan’s stagnation can be 
interpreted as the decrease in the potential growth rate; see, among others, Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002) who understand the stagnation in terms of the private sector’s rational reaction to the 
lowered growth rate of total factor productivity. However, most of the supply-side theories focus 
only on the real side of the economy and abstract from monetary phenomena. The notable 
exception is Andolfatt (2003) who extends the Hayashi-Prescott model into a monetary growth 
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model. However, Andolfatt (2003) focuses on the effects of a series of exogenous negative 
supply shocks to create the prolong stagnation and does not touch on the problems associated 
with the Japanese corporate governance. Further, he considers an exogenous growth model and 
hence the sharp decline in the real growth rate resulting from the conflict of interest between 
corporate insiders and outside investors is out of scope.  
  Second, Murase (2009a,b) are closest in spirit to the present paper in that both papers 
demonstrate that the weak governance of Japanese corporations is the main cause of Japan’s 
prolong stagnation. Specifically, both papers argue this point in a monetary model of 
endogenous growth. However, there is also a crucial difference between his papers and ours. 
That is, he focuses on the labor-capital conflict and the resulting profit squeeze phenomenon. 
Thus, his papers and the present paper focus on the different aspects of the vacuum of 
governance in Japanese corporations, although we think that his papers and ours are not 
mutually exclusive but complementary.  
  Finally, and more broadly, our model is related to the growth models which analyze the 
relationship between insecure property rights and economic growth. Under the lack of proper 
mechanisms of property rights enforcement, economic agents engage not only in productive 
activity but also predatory activity. In dynamic settings of economic growth, Benhabib and 
Radner (1992) and Tornell and Velasco (1992) demonstrate that insecure property rights creates 
the “common pool” effect which reduces the accumulation of capital stock and hence economic 
growth (see also Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell, 1997). The 
appropriation problem stemming from the vacuum of governance which our model focuses on 
leads to a similar “common pool” effect, i.e., outsiders who are appropriated by insiders reduces 
the capital investment, which causes a decline in the economic growth. In this aspect, the 
dynamic models of “common pool” and ours rely on the same effect in explaining the economic 
stagnation. However, most of the “common pool” models focus only on the real side of the 
economy and abstract from monetary phenomena. Further, such models usually analyze a 
single-asset economy, so that the phenomenon of the substitution of capital into money 
generated by the appropriation problem (which is our main focus) is out of scope of the analysis.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up a simple dynamic 
macroeconomic model and explains the basic assumptions. Section 3 analyzes the non-monetary 
version of our model economy as a benchmark and uncovers the basic macroeconomic effects of 
the conflict between inside investors and outside investors. Section 4 extends the model of 
Section 3 to a monetary economy and shows that our model can simultaneously and consistently 
explain the macroeconomic phenomena observed during Japan’s stagnation. Section 5 concludes 
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the paper. 
 
2. The model 
  This section constructs a simple OLG model to simultaneously and consistently explain the 
macroeconomic phenomena observed during the Japan’s stagnation. The model is the extended 
version of the OLG economy of Tirole (1985). The extensions are threefold: (i) Aggregate 
output is proportional to accumulated capital, which may allow an endogenous growth of the 
economy;1 (ii) Agents are heterogeneous in the ability and power to access to capital returns. 
Specifically, they are divided into two groups: insiders who have a larger ability and power to 
access capital returns and outsiders who have a smaller ability and power to do so; (iii) Capital 
accumulation suffers from the appropriation problem due to the conflict between insiders and 
outsiders, i.e., insiders may appropriate (part of) capital returns which should intrinsically 
accrue to outsiders. 
 
2.1. Production 
  The economy produces a single output good using two production factors: capital and labor. 
The output good can be either consumed or used as capital. Capital is accumulated according to 
the following difference equation (or the national income identity): 
 
(1)  y t  = c t  + k t +1 − k t  , 
 
where  y t  is the aggregate output,  c t  is the aggregate consumption,  k t  is the aggregate capital, 
and the subscript denotes time.2  
  We consider a production function of the Romer (1986) type, which takes into account the 
external effect of aggregate capital deepening on the productivity of labor. This type of a 
production function leads to the possibility of an endogenous growth of the economy. 
Specifically, we assume that the production function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form:  
 
(2)  y t  = k t  α{a (k t) l t}  1−α , 
 
────────────
  1 See Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) for the extension of Tirole economy to an endogenous growth economy. 
  2 Here we assume, for algebraic simplicity and without loss of any insight about the qualitative nature of our model
economy, that the depreciation rate of capital is zero. 
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where  a (k t) is the external effect of aggregate capital deepening,  l t  is the aggregate labor, and 
 α is a constant with  0 < α < 1. As discussed in the next subsection, we assume that  l t  is 
constant over time and equal to unity. Also, we assume that the external effect takes the 
following linear form:  a (k t) = A  
1─1−α k t  , where  A is a positive constant. 
  The factor markets are perfectly competitive and hence the factor prices are determined 
according to the principle of marginal productivity. Note that, at the time of employing 
production factors, the employers take factor prices and the external effect of aggregate capital 
deepening  a (k t) as exogenously-given. Hence we obtain:  
 
(3)  w t  = (1 − α) Ak t  , r t  = α A , 
 
where  w t  is the income flow accruing to a unit of labor (henceforth called the real wage) and  r t  
is the income flow accruing to a unit of capital (henceforth called the real interest rate). Note 
that the real interest rate is determined by exogenously-given parameters,  α and  A; hence we 
hereafter drop time subscript from it, i.e.,  r t  = r .  
 
2.2. Preference  
  We consider an overlapping generations economy. Each generation is comprised of a 
continuum of two-period-live agents of measure one. Hence, there is no population growth. For 
analytical simplicity, we assume that each agent has a logarithmic utility function and derives 
the utility from both the consumption when young and the consumption when old: 
 
(4)  U ( c t1 , c t +12  ) = log c t1 + β log c t +12  , 
 
where  c t1 (  ct +12 ) is the consumption when young (when old) of each agent born at time  t and  β 
is her subjective discount factor with  0 ≤ β ≤ 1. 
  Each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor when young and no labor when old; 
hence the aggregate labor supply  l t  is constant over time and equal to unity. Further, each 
young agent is assumed to be identical and earns the same real wage. However, old agents are 
divided into two groups which differ in the ability and power to access to capital returns: 
insiders and outsiders. We assume that the population sizes of insiders and outsiders are 
respectively  θ and  1− θ with  0 < θ < 1. When each agent is young, she knows which group 
she will belong to when old. Then, the budget constraints of each insider and each outsider when 
young are respectively given by:  
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(5)  c t1I + s tI  = w t  , and c t1o + s to = w t  , 
 
where  c t1I (  c t1o) is each insider’s (outsider’s) consumption when young and  s tI  (  s to) is each 
insider’s (outsider’s) savings. .  
  We assume that two assets are available as the means of savings: capital and money. Hence, 
 s tI  = k t +1I  + m tI  and  s to = k t +1o  + m to , where  kt +1I  (  kt +1o ) is each insider’s (outsider’s) capital investment 
and  m tI  (  m to) is each insider’s (outsider’s) real money holdings when young. The two assets 
differ in the following two aspects. First, capital is a productive asset used for good production, 
while money is a non-productive asset serving only as means of store of value. Second, money 
enjoys the perfect protection of property rights since it is privately held by each agent. However, 
capital may lack the perfect protection of property rights since capital thrown into the 
production process may suffer from the appropriation problem. Specifically, we assume that 
insiders may appropriate capital returns which should intrinsically accrue to outsiders. More 
specifically, the budget constraints of each insider and each outsider when old are respectively 
given by: 
 
(6)  c t +12I  = (1 + r )( k t +1I  + ε ──
1− θ
θ
 k t +1o  ) + m t +1I  , and c t +12o  = (1 + r )(1 − ε ) k t +1o  + m t +1o  , 
 
where  ct +12I  (  ct +12o ) is each insider’s (outsider’s) consumption when old, , and  m t +1I  (  m t +1o ) is each 
insider’s (outsider’s) real money holdings when old: note that  m t +1I  = ──
m tI
1+ π t +1
 (m t +1o  = ──
m to
1+ π t +1
), 
where  πt +1 is the expected and actual inflation rate. Further,  ε (  0 ≤ ε ≤ 1) is the appropriation 
rate which parameterizes the degree of the strength of property rights enforcement: the higher 
the value of  ε , the weaker the enforcement, and vice versa. 
 
3. The non-monetary economy 
  We first analyze the non-monetary version of our model economy as the benchmark, so that 
in this section we assume that  m t +1I  =  m t +1o  = 0 . 
 
Saving decision and capital accumulation 
  First, let us discuss the saving decisions of insiders and outsiders. From (4), (5), and (6), 
each insider solves the following maximization problem: 
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(7)  max log (w t  − k t +1I  ) + β log (1 + r )( k t +1I  + ε ──
1− θ
θ
 k t +1o  ) . 
 
This maximization problem yields:  
 
(8)  k t +1I  = ──
β
1+ β
 w t  − ──
1
1+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ
 k t +1o  . 
 
The amount of savings (or that of capital investment in the non-monetary economy) of each 
young insider negatively depends on the appropriation rate and the amount of savings of young 
outsiders. This is exactly the “common pool” effect identified by the growth models of 
Benhabib and Radner (1992) and Tornell and Velasco (1992). Specifically, since we assume a 
logarithmic utility function, the rate of savings of each young insider intrinsically does not 
depend on the rate of capital returns (i.e., the substitution effect associated with the changes in 
the rate of capital returns cancels out its income effect). It is noteworthy, however, that the rate 
of savings of each young insider may changes according to the appropriation rate through the 
additional income effect induced by the “common pool” effect (a decrease in the savings caused 
by an increase in the future income), as seen in (11) below. 
  Meanwhile, each outsider solves the following maximization problem: 
 
(9)  max log (w t  − k t +1o  ) + β log (1 + r )(1 − ε ) k t +1o  . 
 
This maximization problem yields: 
 
(10)  k t +1o  = ──
β
1+ β
 w t  = ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  . 
 
Since the utility function is logarithmic, the rate of savings of each young outsider does not 
depend on the rate of capital returns. Hence, neither it depends on the appropriation rate. 
  Further, from (8) and (10), we can obtain the amount of savings of each young insider as 
follows: 
 
(11)  k t +1I  = (1 − ──
1
1+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ )
 ──
β
1+ β
 w t  = (1 − ──
1
1+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ )
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  . 
 
The rate of savings of each young insider is given by  (1 − ──11+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ )
 ──
β
1+ β
 . Throughout the 
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paper, we limit our analysis to the case where this ratio is positive, i.e.,  1 − ──11+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ
 > 0 . 
Specifically, her saving rate may change according to the appropriation rate although we assume 
a logarithmic utility function which ensures that the saving rate does not depend on the rate of 
capital returns itself.  
  Finally, form (10) and (11), the dynamics of the aggregate capital is given by:  
 
(12)  k t +1 = θk t +1I  + (1 − θ ) k t +1o  = {1 − ───
ε(1− θ )
1+ β }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  . 
 
Hence, it is known that capital accumulation is more deterred as the appropriation rate increases. 
 
Balanced growth path 
  Next, given the results obtained above, we examine the growth rate and the aggregate 
savings of outsiders and insiders in the non-monetary economy.  
  From (12), we obtain the growth rate (  g t ) as: 
 
(13)  1 + g t  = ─
 y t +1
 y t
 = ──
 Ak t +1
 Ak t
 = {1 − ───ε
 (1− θ )
1+ β }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) A ≡ 1 + g NM ( ε ) . 
 
Note that the growth rate is decreasing in the appropriation rate. This occurs because, due to the 
“common pool” effect, insiders who can appropriate part of capital returns of outsiders reduce 
their capital investment, while outsiders’ capital investment does not depend on the 
appropriation rate and is kept constant. 
  Hereafter, to streamline the analysis, we limit our attention to the case where the growth 
rate of the non-monetary economy is positive, i.e.,  g NM ( ε ) > 0 . Further, we assume that the 
non-monetary economy would be dynamically efficient if there were no appropriation problem, 
i.e.,  1+ g NM (0) < 1+ r . It is also noteworthy that, since the capital investments of outsiders and 
insiders are proportional to the aggregate capital investment (see (10) and (11)), the capital 
investments of outsiders and insiders grow at the same rate as the aggregate capital grows. 
Hence, the growth path of our model economy is described as a balanced growth path. 
  The aggregate savings of outsiders at each time are given by the savings of young outsiders 
net of the dissavings of old outsiders. Hence, from (11), the ratio of the aggregate savings of 
outsiders to the national products (i.e., the saving rate of outsiders) is: 
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   σ  t 
o
 = ────────
(1− θ ) k t +1o  − (1− θ ) k to
 y t
 = ────────────
(1− θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1− α ) A(k t− k t −1 )
 Ak t
 
(14)                               . 
     = (1 − θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ){1 − ───1g NM ( ε ) }
 ≡ σ  oNM ( ε ) 
 
Note that the saving rate of outsiders decreases as the appropriation rate increases.3 This occurs 
since the decrease in the growth rate of the national product leads to a decrease in the relative 
size of savings of young agents to those of old agents through the decrease in the growth rate of 
incomes (i.e., real wages). 
  Meanwhile, the ratio of the aggregate savings of insiders to the national product (i.e., the 
saving rate of insiders) is: 
 
   
   σ  t 
I
 = ────
θk t +1I  − θk tI
 y t
 = ────────────────
θ (1− ──11+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ )
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1− α ) A(k t− k t −1 )
 Ak t
 
(15)                               . 
     = θ {1 − ──11+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ){1 − ────11+ g NM ( ε )}
 ≡ σ  INM ( ε ) 
 
Since we have assumed that the rate of savings of each young insider is positive, i.e., 
 1 − ──11+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ
 > 0 , the saving rate of insiders decreases as the appropriation rate increases.4 
This occurs since, in addition to the effects of the decrease in the growth rate as discussed in the 
case of outsiders, the strengthened “common pool” effect directly leads to a decrease in the 
savings of young insiders. Thus, the decrease in the saving rate of insiders has two origins and 
may be severer than that of outsiders.  
  In sum, in the non-monetary economy, the aggravation of the appropriation problem causes 
the decrease in the saving rate of outsiders, that of insiders, and the growth rate of the national 
product. To illustrate the relationships between these macroeconomic variables and the 
appropriation rate, we here use numerical examples. Of course, our model abstracts from many 
important factors of the actual economy. Hence, our theoretical results may, in essence, be 
────────────
  3 Since  , the saving rate of outsiders more rapidly
decreases as the appropriation rate becomes higher. 
  4 Since  , the saving
rate of insiders more rapidly decreases as the appropriation rate becomes higher. 
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compared to the reality of the Japanese economy qualitatively but not quantitatively, although 
we make attempts to seek a set of parameters giving roughly realistic values of some of the 
concerned macroeconomic variables. First, taking a time unit of our OLG model as thirty years, 
we adopt parametric assumption  β = 0.6 (implying that the one-year discount factor is 0.985). 
Second, we set  α = 0.3 (implying the labor share of the economy is 0.7). The values of  θ and 
 A are not easy to specify in isolation. Hence, based on (14), we here try  θ = 0.4 which gives 
2.8% as the real growth rate of national product (the average over the 1980s and the 90s) and 
8.9% as the saving rate of outsiders (the average over the 1980s and the 90s). Finally, since the 
reality of value of  A is harder to evaluate, we try three values (small, medium, and large), i.e., 
 A = 15,  A = 20, and  A = 25. These values of  A are chosen so as to give positive saving rates of 
insiders both in the non-monetary economy analyzed here and in the monetary economy 
analyzed in the next section. Figures 7, 8, and 9 depict the relationships between these 
macroeconomic variables against the appropriation rate (Note that the growth rate of the 
national product is expressed as the one per annum). The model might capture some 
macroeconomic phenomena observed during Japan’s stagnation, namely, the decline in the 
saving rate of households (outsiders) and the growth rate, but would not reach the full 
description of the phenomena addressed in the introduction such as the rise in the saving rate of 
corporations (insiders). In the next section, we will discuss how the results are modified if we 
consider a monetary version of our economy. 
 
4. The monetary economy 
  In this section, we analyze the monetary version of our model economy in which agents can 
use money as well as capital as a means of store of value. 
 
Saving decision and capital accumulation 
  First, let us discuss the saving decisions of insiders and outsiders. Again, from (4), (5), and 
(6), each insider solves the following maximization problem: 
 
(16)   max log (w t  − k t +1I  − m tI  ) + β log {(1 + r )( k t +1I  + ε ──
1− θ
θ
 k t +1o  ) + ──
m tI
1+ π t +1
} . 
 
This maximization problem yields:  
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(17)   . 
   
   
 
  Meanwhile, each outsider solves the following maximization problem: 
 
(18)   max log (w t  − k t +1o  − m to ) + β log {(1 + r )(1 − ε ) k t +1o  + ──
m to
1+ π t +1
} . 
 
This maximization problem yields: 
 
    
   
(19)   . 
   
    
 
  Thus, from (17) and (19), we obtain: 
 
    
   
    
   
(20)   . 
   
    
   
    
 
  Note that the aggregate capital and the aggregate money demand are given by 
 k t +1 = θk t +1I  + (1 − θ ) k t +1o  and  m t  = θm tI  + (1 − θ ) m to respectively. Hence, from (19) and (20), 
the dynamics of aggregate capital and the aggregate money demand are expressed as:  
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(21)   , 
   
    
   
    
 
and  
 
              m t  = 0 ,          if    (1 + r )(1 − ε ) > ──
1
1+ π t +1
 
   
           m t  = (1 − θ ) m to ,        if    (1 + r )(1 − ε ) = ──
1
1+ π t +1
 
   
(22)    m t  = (1 − θ ) ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  ,     if  (1 + r )(1 − ε ) < ──
1
1+ π t +1
 < 1 + r . 
   
   m t  = θm tI  + (1 − θ ) ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  ,    if        ──
1
1+ π t +1
 = 1 + r 
   
        m t  = ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  ,       if        ──
1
1+ π t +1
 > 1 + r 
 
Balanced growth path 
  Next, given the results obtained above, we examine the economic growth rate, the 
aggregate savings of outsiders and insiders, and the money demand in the monetary economy. 
For convenience, we here define  κ t  ≡ m t  / y t  (i.e., Marshall’s k). We again focus on the balanced 
growth path, on which output, capital, and real money balances grow at the same rate. Hence, on 
the path, Marshall’s k and the saving rate are constant over time.  
 
(23)  1 + g t  = ─
 y t +1
 y t
 = ─
k t +1
k t
 = ─
m t +1
m t
 = ──11+ π t +1
 . 
 
  To present the analysis clearly, we separately discuss the following three cases. 
 
Case 1 (  (1 + r )(1 − ε ) > ──11+ π t +1
 ). 
  In this case, the dynamics of the economy is the same as that of the non-monetary economy 
since  m t +1I  = m t +1o  = 0 . That is, the growth rate of the national product and the saving rates of 
outsiders and insiders in the “Case 1” monetary economy are respectively given by 
 1 + g  M1( ε ) = 1 + g  NM( ε ) ,  σ  oM1( ε ) = σ  oNM( ε ) , and  σ  IM1( ε ) = σ  INM( ε ) . Hence, the saving rate of 
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outsiders and that of insiders, and the growth rate are all decreasing in the appropriation rate, 
with  κ t  = 0 .  
  Note that both  1 + g  M1( ε )  and  (1 + r )(1 − ε )  are decreasing linear functions of  ε  . 
Further,  1 + g  M1( 0 ) < 1 + r (which means that the economy with no appropriation problem is 
dynamically efficient) and  1 + g  M1( 1 ) > 0 .5 Hence,  1 + g  M1( ε* ) = (1 + r )(1 − ε* ) has a unique 
solution  ε* ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) and we confirm that Case 1 occurs when  0 ≤ ε ≤ ε* . 
 
Case 2(  (1 + r )(1 − ε ) = ──11+ π t +1
 ). 
  In this case, the dynamics of the economy is expressed by the following two equations: 
 
(24)  k t +1 = {1 − ───
ε(1− θ )
1+ β }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  − ( 1 − ──
ε
1+ β )
 m t  , 
 
and 
 
(25)  (1 + r )(1 − ε ) = ─m
 
t +1
m t
 . 
 
Rearranging (23) and (24) yields: 
 
(26)  1 + g t  = {1 − ───
ε(1− θ )
1+ β }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) A − ( 1 − ──ε1+ β )
 Aκ t  , 
 
and rearranging (23) and (25) yields: 
 
(27)  1 + g t  = (1 + r )(1 − ε ) ≡ 1 + g 
 M 2( ε ) . 
 
Hence, from (26) and (27), we obtain: 
 
(28)  κ t  = ────────────────
{1− ───ε
 (1− θ)
1+ β }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1− α ) A − (1+ r )(1− ε )
(1− ──ε1+ β )
 A
 ≡ κ  M 2( ε ) . 
 
From (28), it is easily checked that Case 2 occurs when  ε* ≤ ε < ε**  where 
 κ  M 2( ε**) = (1 − θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ) or alternatively  1 + g  M 2( ε**) = θ ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ) A (notice that 
────────────
  5 Both conditions, together with the fact that  1 + g  M1( ε ) and  ( 1 + r )( 1 − ε ) are linear functions of  ε , imply that
 g  M1'( ε ) > − ( 1 + r ) . 
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 (1 − θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  is the total amount of savings of young outsiders and 
 θ ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  is that of young insiders). 
  We can confirm that  g  M 2 '( ε ) = − (1 + r ) < g  M 1 '( ε ) < 0  (see footnote 7) and 
 κ  M 2 '( ε ) = ──β1+ β
 ─────────
(1+ r ) + {──θ1+ β
 (1− α ) A}
(1− ──ε1+ β )
  
2
 A
 > 0 .6 The growth rate decreases more rapidly in Case 
2 than in Case 1 as the appropriation rate increases. This occurs because, in Case 2, outsiders 
more rely on money instead of capital in making their savings as the appropriation rate 
increases. This phenomenon is also reflected in the fact that Marshall’s k rapidly increases as the 
appropriation rate increases. 
  The aggregate savings of outsiders at each time are given by the savings of young outsiders 
net of the dissavings of old outsiders. Hence, from (19), the saving rate of outsiders is: 
 
   
   σ  t 
o
 = ──────────────
(1− θ )( k t +1o  + m to ) − (1− θ )( k to + m t −1o  )
 y t
 = ────────────
(1− θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1− α ) A(k t− k t −1 )
 Ak t
 
(29)                                      . 
     = (1 − θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ){1 − ────11 + g  M 2 ( ε )}
 ≡ σ  oM 2 ( ε ) 
 
It is easily checked that  σ  oM 2 '( ε ) = (1 − θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ) ─────
g  M 2 '( ε )
{1 + g  M 2 ( ε )} 2
 < σ  oM1 '( ε ) < 0 , since 
 g  M 2 '( ε ) < g  M 1 '( ε ) < 0 and  0 < g  M 2 ( ε ) < g  M 1 ( ε )  . The saving rate of outsiders more rapidly 
decreases in Case 2 than in Case 1 as the appropriation rate increases.7 This occurs because the 
decrease in the growth rate of the national product leads to a decrease in the relative size of 
savings of young agents to those of old agents through the decrease in the growth rate of income 
(i.e., real wage). 
  Meanwhile, from (20), the saving rate of insiders is: 
────────────
   
  6 Note that  . Hence, the Marshall’s k more rapidly
decreases as the appropriation rate becomes higher. 
  7 Note that  . Hence, the saving rate of outsiders
more rapidly decreases as the appropriation rate becomes higher. 
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   σ  t 
I
 = ────
θk t +1I  − θk tI
 y t
 = ────────────────────────
θ (1− ──11+ β
 ε ──1−
 θ
θ )
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1− α ) A(k t− k t −1 ) + ──
1
1+ β
 ε (m t− m t −1 )
 Ak t
 
(30)                                         . 
     = [{θ − ───ε(1−
 θ )
1+ β }
 ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) + ──ε1+ β
 κ  M 2( ε )]{1 − ────11 + g  M 2 ( ε )}
 ≡ σ  IM 2 ( ε ) 
 
The differentiation of (30) yields: 
  
 Thus, the sign of  σ  IM 2 '( ε ) depends on the relative magnitudes of the two opposing effects: 
The first is a negative effect stemming from the decrease in the growth rate of national product 
which also appears in Case 1, while the second effect is a positive one stemming from the 
portfolio change of outsiders which is reflected in the increase in Marshall’s k. Unfortunately, a 
general condition about which one of the two opposing effects dominates the other is not easy to 
analytically obtain. Hence, using a set of reasonable parameter values, we show the existence of 
the case where the first effect is dominated by the second effect within the range of 
 ε ∈ [ε*’
 ε** )  . Specifically, as in the analysis of the non-monetary economy, we fix the 
parameter values as  β = 0.6,  α = 0.3,  θ = 0.4, and  A = 15;  β = 0.6,  α = 0.3,  θ = 0.4, and 
 A = 20; and  β = 0.6,  α = 0.3,  θ = 0.4, and  A = 25. In each case, we obtain:  ε* = 0.39 and 
 ε** = 0.71;  ε* = 0.35 and  ε** = 0.70); and  ε* = 0.32 and  ε** = 0.69. Figure 10 below depicts 
the relationship between the saving rate of insiders and the appropriation rate. In these 
numerical examples, we confirm that the saving rate of insiders may increase as the 
appropriation rate increases within the range of  ε ∈ [ε*’
 ε** ) in the cases of  A = 20 and 
 A = 25. This seemingly paradoxical result occurs because, as the appropriation rate increases, 
outsiders restrain themselves from the capital investment and promote the money holdings. This 
means that the amount of resources which insiders can appropriate decreases. In other words, 
the “common pool” effect becomes more moderate as the appropriation rate increases, which 
may in turn promote the capital investment of insiders.  
 
Case 3 ( (1 + r )(1 − ε ) < ──11+ π t +1
 < 1 + r ) 
  In this case, the dynamics of the economy is expressed by the following two equations: 
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(31)  k t +1 = θ ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  , 
   
and 
   
(32)  m t  = (1 − θ ) ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) Ak t  . 
 
Rearranging (31) yields: 
 
(33)  1 + g t  = θ ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) A ≡ 1 + g  M 3 , 
 
and rearranging (32) yields: 
 
(34)  κ t  = (1 − θ ) ──
β
1+ β
 (1 − α ) ≡ κ  M 3 . 
 
Hence, in Case3, the appropriation rate affects neither the growth rate nor Marshall’s k.  
  Further, from (32) and (33), it is known that the condition  (1 + r )(1 − ε ) < 1 + g  M 3 < 1 + r 
should hold for Case 3. This implies that Case 3 occurs when  ε** ≤ ε < 1 .8 
  The aggregate savings of outsiders at each time are again given by the savings of young 
outsiders net of the dissavings of old outsiders. Hence, from (19), the saving rate of outsiders is: 
 
   
   σ  t 
o
 = ─────────
(1− θ ) m to − (1− θ ) m t −1o
 y t
 = ────────────
(1− θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1− α ) A(k t− k t −1 )
 Ak t
 
(35)                                . 
     = (1 − θ ) ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ){1 − ───11 + g  M 3 }
 ≡ σ  oM 3 
 
  Similarly, from (20), the saving rate of insiders: 
 
   
   σ  t 
I
 = ────
θk t +1I  − θk tI
 y t
 = ──────────
θ ──
β
1+ β
 (1− α ) A(k t− k t −1 )
 Ak t
 
(36)                        . 
     = θ ──β1+ β
 (1 − α ){1 − ───11 + g  M 3 }
 ≡ σ  IM 3 
   
────────────
  8 Recall that we assume that the economy with no appropriation problem is dynamically efficient, i.e.,
 1 + g  NM( 0 ) < 1 + r . Hence,  1 + r ≤ ──11+ π t +1
 is impossible in our economy because the condition implies that the
growth rate of the economy with the appropriation problem is larger than  g  NM( 0 ) . 
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Hence, in Case3, the appropriation rate is irrelevant to both the saving rate of outsiders and that 
of insiders.  
  In sum, in the monetary economy, the aggravation of the appropriation problem causes the 
decrease in the saving rate of outsiders and the growth rate of national product. However, it can 
increase the saving rate of insiders as well as Marshall’s k. We depict the relationships between 
these macroeconomic variables and the appropriation rate using numerical examples:  β = 0.6, 
 α = 0.3,  θ = 0.4, and  A = 15;  β = 0.6,  α = 0.3,  θ = 0.4, and  A = 20; and  β = 0.6,  α = 0.3, 
 θ = 0.4, and  A = 25 (see Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13). As indicated by the analytical results 
obtained above as well as the figures illustrating them (especially in the cases of  A = 20 and 
 A = 25) the model can consistently capture the notable features of the macroeconomic 
phenomena observed during Japan’s stagnation addressed in the introduction.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper has offered a simple dynamic macroeconomic model to provide a new 
explanation to the co-existence of the macroeconomic phenomena observed during Japan’s 
stagnation since the early 1990s. Our crucial extension of the standard macroeconomic model is 
the explicit incorporation of the conflict between corporate insiders and outside investors into a 
process of capital accumulation. Specifically, we assume that insiders may appropriate part of 
capital returns which should intrinsically accrue to outsiders.  
  In this model setting, we have obtained the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that, as the 
appropriation problem becomes severer, insiders increase (rather than decrease) their capital 
investment. This result occurs because, as the appropriation problem becomes severer, outsiders 
restrain themselves from the capital investment and promote the money holdings. This implies 
that the amount of resources which insiders can appropriate decreases. Hence, reacting to the 
portfolio change of outsiders, insiders increase the capital investment using the corporate 
savings. This property of our model may reasonably well trace the co-existence of the decrease 
in the household saving rate and the increase in the corporate saving rate observed during 
Japan’s stagnation. 
  Finally, we wish to mention the future extensions of the current research. In the present 
model, we focus on the means of store of value as a role of money. However, in the real world, 
money plays a role of the means of exchange media, so that it is interesting to analyze how the 
results obtained in this paper are affected when we explicitly consider both roles of money. 
Specifically, in such an extended framework, we may examine the movement of the nominal 
─ 53 ─ 
interest rate according to the change in the appropriation rate and its effect on economic growth. 
Further, since the analytical framework offered in this paper is quite standard except for the 
incorporation of the conflict between corporate insiders and outside investors into the model. 
Hence, it might be applied to various macroeconomic phenomena of many other countries. For 
example, Continental European countries had been trapped in a prolonged stagnation in the 
1980s, but some of them experienced steady recovery in the 1990s. It has been often argued 
that, behind this economic revitalization, the reform of their corporate governance systems 
(especially, the introduction of capital market discipline and the removal of labor market 
rigidity) can considerably raise the rate of capital returns of those countries’ corporations. This 
experience of Continental European countries may suggest that international comparative 
studies based on the macroeconomic framework incorporating the conflict between corporate 
insiders and outside investors is also an interesting topic of future research which might provide 
a more profound understanding of the relation between corporate governance and 
macroeconomic performance. 
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Figure 1. The ratio of M1 to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet 
Office, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The ratio of M2+CD to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet 
Office, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
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Figure 3. The ratio of household savings to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The ratio of corporate savings to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
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Figure 5. The growth rate of real GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The ratio of interest payments plus dividend payouts to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
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Figure 7. The saving rate of outsiders (The non-monetary economy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The saving rate of insiders (The non-monetary economy) 
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Figure 9. The growth rate of national product (The non-monetary economy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The saving rate of outsiders (The monetary economy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ε* = 0.39 and  ε** = 0.71 (  A = 15 ) ;  ε* = 0.35 and  ε** = 0.70 (  A = 20 ) ;  ε* = 0.32 and  ε** = 0.69 (  A = 25 ).  
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Figure 11. The saving rate of insiders (The monetary economy)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Note:  ε* = 0.39 and  ε** = 0.71 (  A = 15 ) ;  ε* = 0.35 and  ε** = 0.70 (  A = 20 ) ;  ε* = 0.32 and  ε** = 0.69 (  A = 25 ).  
 
 
 
Figure 12. The growth rate of national product (The monetary economy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Note:  ε* = 0.39 and  ε** = 0.71 (  A = 15 ) ;  ε* = 0.35 and  ε** = 0.70 (  A = 20 ) ;  ε* = 0.32 and  ε** = 0.69 (  A = 25 ).  
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Figure 13. Marshall’s K (The monetary economy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ε* = 0.39 and  ε** = 0.71 (  A = 15 ) ;  ε* = 0.35 and  ε** = 0.70 (  A = 20 ) ;  ε* = 0.32 and  ε** = 0.69 (  A = 25 ).  
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